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1. Monetary policy in France and Germany : why would it be so different ? 
 
• Since 1999, France and Germany share the same money and have monetary policy interest rates 
determined commonly by the ECB. But this is far from being the end of the story… 
 
• A strong presumption that monetary policy does not transmit identically across countries. A simple 
look at the different monetary transmission channels helps understanding why it might be different. 
Mishkin (1995) identifies 4 broad monetary policy transmission channels : 
 
i. Exchange rate channel : 
i_ECB Nominal 
Exchange 
rate 
Competitivity Net exports 
 
Bilateral exchange movements are identical! But not the competitivity (once costs and prices 
adjustments are taken into account). Price-elasticities also differ. 
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ii. Asset price channels (stock and house prices) 
i_ECB Stock and 
house 
prices 
Tobin’s q
Investment and 
consumption 
Wealth
 
Each causal link is a potential source of heterogeneity. But this channel may be of minor 
importance for France and Germany. 
 
iii. interest rate channel : in the IS / LM model, it simply goes from the interest rate to the 
investment decisions. In practice, the interest rate determined by the ECB does not directly 
influence final decisions : 
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i_ECB i_market Investment
 
- Financial markets and especially money and bonds market are integrated (Jappelli & Pagano, 
2008) ⇒ transmission of the monetary policy interest rate to the market interest rate may not be 
of particular interest here 
- pass-through between monetary policy or market interest rates to retail markets and the 
sensitivities of investment, and credits to market and retail bank interest rates.  
 
Why such a heterogeneity? 
- competition among banks, competition between bank and financial markets, size of banks, 
concentration, size of firms, debt of non financial firms and households … (see Penot, 2002) 
 
 
Consumption i_retail Credit 
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iv. Credit channel (bank-lending channel and balance-sheet channel) 
i_ECB
Asset prices External 
finance premia 
Cash-flows 
Consumption and 
investment 
 
The bank-lending channel describes under which conditions a monetary policy tightening is transmitted to 
the banks’ balance-sheet and then to the firms’ ability to raise funds. 
 
Asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard) are highlighted. It must not be seen as a 
substitute of the other channels but rather as a complement of the interest rate channel. 
The asymmetries also stem from the size of banks and firms, switching costs, debt of agents… 
 
⇒ MP transmission is asymmetric due to heterogeneities. The role of banks may be crucial… Next we 
present some macro evidence, we present the main characteristics of the financial systems and we 
focus on the pass-through of monetary policy to retail bank interest rates. 
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2. Monetary policy in France and Germany : some macro evidence 
 
• Asymmetries of MP transmission are analyzed in a series of paper (see Mojon & Peersman, 2003 for 
example) → asymmetries are confirmed but the magnitude is uncertain (Penot, 2002). We just present 
a quick update of this literature and focus on the special cases of France and Germany during the EMU 
period. 
 
• VAR analysis of the MP transmission: 
? Variables: GDP, Inflation, short term rates, long term rates, real effective exchange rate (real 
terms and first differentiated). 
? Sample period: from 1996 to 2007 (quarterly data) – Implicit hypothesis : no break inthe couple 
of years before 1999. 
? 4 models : (GDP, ∏, IRS) - (GDP, ∏, IRS, IRL) - (GDP, ∏, REER, IRS) - (GDP, ∏, REER, IRS, 
IRL) 
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We focus on the decomposition of variance of GDP and inflation. Which shocks contributed to the GDP or 
inflation variance? 
 
GDP Inflation Decomposition of 
variance France Germany France Germany 
IRS 
2nd quarter 
8th quarter 
 
21.8 
19.95 
 
4.4 
6.77 
 
0.99 
14.35 
 
0.05 
0.35 
 
GDP Inflation Decomposition of 
variance France Germany France Germany 
IRS 
2nd quarter 
8th quarter 
 
15.40 
10.34 
 
5.08 
6.24 
 
1.47 
2.55 
 
0.00 
1.19 
IRL 
2nd quarter 
8th quarter 
 
18.19 
17.94 
 
1.61 
1.53 
 
12.19 
14.68 
 
2.14 
2.21 
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GDP Inflation Decomposition of 
variance France Germany France Germany 
IRS 
2nd quarter 
8th quarter 
 
0.32 
0.50 
 
4.90 
5.62 
 
0.63 
0.66 
 
0.00 
1.04 
IRL 
2nd quarter 
8th quarter 
 
0.87 
0.83 
 
1.72 
1.62 
 
1.26 
1.30 
 
2.11 
2.17 
REER 
2nd quarter 
8th quarter 
 
20.15 
25.0 
 
1.10 
2.31 
 
1.79 
1.83 
 
0.04 
0.14 
 
As a conclusion, it can be said that a regular substantial difference between France and Germany has 
occurred. The monetary channel is always revealed in the case of France (either via the interest rate, short or 
long, or the exchange rate); whereas none or less can be found in Germany.  
 
• 2nd step: estimates of the aggregate demand equation: same dataset but a parsimonious model 
We get similar results: MP transmission is significantly revealed for France (long term interest rate seems to 
be the key variable in the transmission channel). It is less significant in Germany except for the REER and 
not always correctly signed. 
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 Germany France 
Constant 
 
0.0015 
(0.00) 
0.0014 
(0.00) 
0.0014 
(0.00) 
0.0019 
(0.00) 
0.0019 
(0.00) 
0.0020 
(0.00) 
GPD(-1) 
 
0.0326 
(0.83) 
0.166 
(0.29) 
0.077 
(0.63) 
0.21 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.32) 
0.14 
(0.41) 
IRS(-1) 
 
0.0022 
(0.06) 
 0.0019 
(0.10) 
-0.0014
(0.09) 
 0.0004 
(0.66) 
IRL(-5) 
 
 -0.0015 
(0.14) 
-0.0016 
(0.10) 
 -0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.0021
(0.02) 
TCER(-2) 
 
-0.0011
(0.04) 
-0.0016
(0.01) 
-0.0013 
(0.03) 
-0.0011
(0.02) 
-0.0011
(0.01) 
-0.0005 
(0.37) 
Adj-R squared 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.27 0.14 
Jarque – Bera 
 
1.16 
(0.56) 
1.04 
(0.59) 
0.80 
(0.67) 
2.19 
(0.33) 
0.17 
(0.91) 
0.62 
(0.73) 
Note: p-value in brackets. 
 
Lessons from econometrics on macro aggregates ? 
i. MP shocks contributed more to the GDP growth in France 
ii. MP is rather transmitted through the movements of the long term interest rates 
iii. Effect on GDP growth is asymmetric and stronger in France 
iv. the exchange rate channel is still alive 
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3. The German and French financial systems: a brief comparison 
 
Generally, the German financial system is characterized as a bank-based oriented system in opposition 
with the US or the UK’s market-based system. France would be in a middle position. 
 
• The German 3-pilar banking system / The French banking system 
- Germany: commercial banks (with the 4 largest : Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank 
and HVB), public banks (federal or state government banks: the Sparkassen and Landesbanken) 
and cooperative banks form the model of what is called “universal banks”. All institutions are 
more or less involved in the usual retail banking activities (deposit, loans, funds transfers, etc). 
- France: the AFB banks (French association of banks) which are commercial banks and the 
network of cooperative and mutual banks 
 
• The number of credit institutions : advantage for Germany 
The number of banks in Germany largely exceeds their number in France but in each country, but it 
decreases regularly since the beginning of the 90’s because of the deregulation of the banking system. 
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A decrease is also observed in France but the deregulation occurred sooner in France (during the 80’s) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Germany 2365 2226 2147 2089 2048 
France 989 939 897 854 829 
Source: ECB, “EU banking structures”, October 2007. 
Germany 
 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
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France 
 
Source: Annual report of the CECEI (2006) 
 
⇒ Despite deregulation, the proportion of loans issued by German banks is more dispersed and the market 
shares of the 5 largest credit institutions are higher in France. 
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Germany 
 
 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
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France 
 
Source: Commission bancaire report, 2006 
 
Market shares of the 5 largest credit institutions, in % of total assets 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Germany 20,5 21,6 22,1 21,6 22 
France 44.6 46.7 49.2 52.3 52.3 
EU 25 38.3 39.8 41 42.2 42.1 
Sources: ECB (2007), “EU banking structures”, p. 53. 
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• Market capitalization : advantage for France 
German market capitalisation is very low compared to other major economies like the US, UK, Japan and 
even France: It represented 53.5 % of the GDP in 2006 vs. 102 % for France 
 
Market capitalization, billions of euros, 2006 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
• In summary: broadly speaking the size of Germans’ banks is smaller compared to France, the bank-
industry relationship are stronger in Germany. In France, the banking system is more concentrated and 
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there may be more competition among banks and between banks and financial markets. In Germany, 
SMEs are still relying heavily on banks to finance their investment (Deeg, 2007). 
 
4. The retail bank interest rate pass-through 
 
• The pass-through of MP rate to the retail bank interest rates is representative of the asymmetries of the 
MP transmission. It may be the direct consequence of the differences in the banking system. 
 
• Following De Bondt (2002), we estimate an error correction model : 
( )1 1t t t t tbr mr br mrγ φ α β ε− −Δ = + Δ − − +  
 
The formulation is implicitly based on a marginal cost pricing model where the bank applies a mark-up on 
the marginal cost of funds ⇒ (mr) should be a market rate corresponding to the maturity of the bank 
interest rate (br). But it was more direct to consider the money market interest rate in order to assess the 
transmission of MP. 
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• Data : ECB dataset with monthly harmonized statistics since 2003 
→ Data on new business volumes 
→ Distinction between loans for house purchasing and loans to non financial companies (NFC) 
→ Distinction according to the maturity (period of fixed interest rate) 
→ For NFC, distinction according to the amount of the loan (more or less than 1 Million euro). 
 
• We focus on :  
- Φ the immediate pass-through 
- β the long-term pass-through 
- α the adjustment speed to the long term equilibrium 
- 
( )1 φ
α
−
 the mean-adjustment lag 
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France - Housing loans 
 
 Long term 
pass-
through 
Short term 
pass-
through 
Adjustment 
speed 
Adjustment-
lag 
Less than 1 year 
Between 1 and 5 years 
Between 5 and 10 years 
More than 10 years 
0.71 
0.57 
0.65 
0.90 
0.05 
0.09 
0.13 
0.05 
0.16 
0.11 
0.08 
0.05 
6 
8 
10 
19 
 
 
Germany - Housing loans 
 Long term 
pass-
through 
Short term 
pass-
through 
Adjustment 
speed 
Adjustment-
lag 
Less than 1 year 
Between 1 and 5 years 
Between 5 and 10 years 
More than 10 years 
0.64 
0.37 
0.25 
0.20 
0.26 
0.37 
0.19 
0.21 
0.28 
0.13 
0.06 
0.06 
3 
5 
13 
13 
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France - Loans to Non financial corporates 
Amount <1 M € Long term 
pass-
through 
Short term 
pass-
through 
Adjustment 
speed 
Adjustment-
lag 
Less than 1 year 
Between 1 and 5 years 
More than 5 years 
1.01 
0.48 
0.64 
0.61 
0.06 
0.06 
0.20 
0.15 
0.08 
2 
6 
11 
 
 
Germany - Loans to Non financial corporates 
Amount <1 M € Long term 
pass-
through 
Short term 
pass-
through 
Adjustment 
speed 
Adjustment-
lag 
Less than 1 year 
Between 1 and 5 years 
More than 5 years 
0.79 
0.43 
0.28 
0.56 
0.28 
0.21 
0.54 
0.12 
0.09 
1 
6 
8 
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France - Loans to Non financial corporates 
Amount >1 M € Long term 
pass-
through 
Short term 
pass-
through 
Adjustment 
speed 
Adjustment-
lag 
Less than 1 year 
Between 1 and 5 years 
More than 5 years 
0.94 
0.79 
0.47 
0.53 
0.01 
0.31 
0.43 
0.97 
0.31 
1 
1 
2 
 
 
Germany - Loans to Non financial corporates 
Amount >1 M € Long term 
pass-
through 
Short term 
pass-
through 
Adjustment 
speed 
Adjustment-
lag 
Less than 1 year 
Between 1 and 5 years 
More than 5 years 
0.86 
0.71 
0.37 
0.70 
0.20 
0.60 
0.49 
0.87 
0.20 
1 
1 
2 
 
• Asymmetry is confirmed. The differences observed in the pass-through of MP rates to retail bank 
interest rates may explain why the MP channel appears stronger. 
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• Heyer & Timbeau (2006) : household bank rate depend on the interest rate spread → a cut in MP rates 
would imply a rise in the bank rate:  
 
Equation in the long term of the household debt rate* 
 Germany France 
Critical spread  0,035 0,036 
Spread of interest rates**  0,025 
Unemployment rate  -0,04 
Real-estate wealth***  0,05 
Dummy liberalization****  0,22 
* ln (household debt / gross disposable income) 
** Spread between 10 years interest rate and 3 months interest rate 
*** ln (Real-estate wealth / gross diposable income) 
**** Dummy between 1985 and 1991. 
Source : Heyer & Timbeau (2006). 
 
• A 1 point decrease in the short term interest rates → the French household debt rate rises by 2,5 % in 
the long run. It has no effect on the German household debt rate. 
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• It may contributes to explain why credits to households have been more dynamic in France 
 
Annual growth rate of outstanding amount of loan for house purchasing
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5. Conclusion 
 
• The reality of asymmetries has been confirmed by a macro analysis on the MP transmission between 
France and Germany. 
 
• We have augmented that it may result from differences in the role played by banks in the 2 countries 
 
• The pass-through of MP rates to retail bank rates is part of the story 
 
• What should we do now ? 
- run the same econometrics to estimate the pass-through over a longer data period 
- Estimate a credit equation for France and Germany to gauge the importance of MP for the 
dynamism of credit growth (households and NFC) 
